Excluding Unfit Workers: Social Control Versus Social Justice in the Age of Economic Reform by Bernstein, David E. & Leonard, Thomas C.
08_BERNSTEIN & LEONARD_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009 1:24:03 PM 
 
EXCLUDING UNFIT WORKERS: 
SOCIAL CONTROL VERSUS SOCIAL 
JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF ECONOMIC 
REFORM 
DAVID E. BERNSTEIN* 
THOMAS C. LEONARD** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigration, working poverty, and the relationship of women to the labor 
market are vital and contentious issues today, as they were a century ago, when 
some influential, progressive social scientists blueprinted and began 
constructing the house of American labor reform. New Deal liberals later 
expanded the edifice. This article documents that the original progressive 
architects, and some New Deal renovators, were partisans of human inequality. 
The labor legislation they pioneered was, in important respects, designed to 
exclude immigrants, women, and African Americans. 
In section II of this article, we discuss the origins and development of a 
progressive economic ideology that favored, indeed demanded, the exclusion of 
various so-called “defective” groups from the American labor market. 
Xenophobia, race prejudice, and sexism certainly were not new to the United 
States in the Progressive Era. What was new was, first, the idea that protecting 
deserving workers required the social control of undeserving workers, enough 
so that labor-legislation advocates defended the exclusion of unfit workers not 
as an ostensibly necessary evil, but as a positive social benefit. Second, the 
exclusion of undesirables acquired a new scientific legitimacy: the Progressive 
Era marked not only the advent of the welfare state but also an extraordinary 
vogue for race thinking and for eugenics, the social control of human breeding. 
The new science of eugenics biologized the established discourses of bigotry 
and nativism, remaking undesirables into the hereditarily unfit and elevating 
exclusion to a matter of national and racial health. And the new sciences of 
society, especially economics, showed how unfit workers wrongly lowered the 
wages and employment of racially superior groups. 
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In section III, we discuss the practical impact progressive ideology had on 
labor reform in the 1930s. The intellectual heirs of progressivism used the 
prevailing economic crisis to promote previously unachievable government 
involvement in the labor market to the detriment of those deemed excludable. 
We first consider the Davis–Bacon Act, a law passed with the intent of 
preventing itinerant African American workers and others from competing with 
white labor unionists for jobs on federal construction projects. Next, we turn to 
New Deal minimum-wage legislation. The first national minimum wages were 
imposed by the National Industrial Recovery Act, which in turn begat the 
freestanding Fair Labor Standards Act. Architects of both laws knew the laws 
would create disproportionate unemployment among southern African 
Americans, an especially poor and vulnerable group. But most advocates of 
these laws saw the resulting unemployment, at worst, as an unfortunate 
necessity, and in many cases as a positive feature. The New Dealers were 
determined to destroy the low-wage industrial economy of the South and to 
promote a national “family wage,” regardless of the immediate human toll on 
the unemployed. And the most efficient way to destroy the low-wage industrial 
economy was to ban low-wage employment. 
Finally, we consider the resurrection and expansion of single-sex, state 
minimum-wage laws in the 1930s. Such laws had been held unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court in 19231 but were upheld by the Court in 1937.2 The Court 
adopted the conventional wisdom in contemporary liberal circles: women who 
could not command a “living wage” as defined by statute should be expunged 
from the labor force. For the next several decades, the judiciary treated women 
workers’ claims to equal treatment by labor law dismissively. 
II 
THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE LABOR IDEOLOGY 
A. Setting the Stage 
The last one-third of the nineteenth century witnessed truly spectacular 
changes in American economic life. Following the Civil War, the United States 
industrialized on a revolutionary scale; the ensuing growth in productivity, in 
output, and in wealth was unprecedented in human history. Industrialization 
coincided with the development of a transportation and communication 
infrastructure; railroad and telegraph networks both measured and fostered the 
new national scope of American markets. The transformation from an 
agricultural to an industrial economy gave rise to a set of profound social 
dislocations, among them “urbanization,” a rubric that characterizes the effects 
of the migration from farm to factory and of the explosive growth in American 
cities. Urban workers, particularly those residing in immigrant slums, faced 
 
 1. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 2. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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substandard housing, poor public health, and unemployment, especially during 
the economic depression of the 1890s. 
Growth in labor demand was met, in part, by immigration to America on a 
large scale, which introduced polyglot peoples with disparate cultural and 
religious traditions. By 1910, twenty-two percent of the U.S. labor force was 
foreign-born.3 Coincident with industrialization, nationalization, urbanization, 
and immigration were the 1880s rise of labor unions (craft and mass) and the 
1890s consolidation of industry into pools and trusts. The concentration of labor 
and capital intensified the recurrent and sometimes violent labor conflict, for 
which names like Haymarket, Homestead, and Pullman still serve as 
synecdoches. 
B. The Progressive Response: Bringing in the State 
Academic economists and their reform allies played a leading role in the 
extraordinary Progressive Era expansion of the government’s role in the 
American economy. By the outbreak of the first World War in 1914, the U.S. 
government had created the Federal Reserve banking system, amended the 
Constitution to institute a graduated personal-income tax, established the 
Federal Trade Commission, applied antitrust laws to industrial combinations, 
restricted immigration, regulated food and drug safety, and supervised railroad 
rates.4 State governments, where the reform impulse was stronger still, 
regulated working conditions, inspected factories, banned child labor, 
compelled education for children, capped working hours, set minimum wages, 
and taxed inheritances.5 
Economic reformers were instrumental in effecting nearly all these 
Progressive Era reforms, none more so than the labor legislation that 
epitomizes the Progressive Era. But the original progressives, some 
hagiographic historiography notwithstanding, were not a one-dimensional band 
of “heroic liberals snatching helpless social science from the clutches of vile 
Social Darwinists.”6 The progressives were, in fact, simultaneously conservative 
and liberal. Moreover, many were enthusiastic biologizers, and most were 
elitist. Their liberal (progressive) instincts led them to call for social justice, to 
uplift the poor and disenfranchised. Their conservative instincts led them to call 
for social control, to impose order upon the causes of economic and social 
disorder. As elitists, the progressives believed that intellectuals should guide 
social and economic progress, a belief erected upon two subsidiary faiths: a faith 
in the disinterestedness and incorruptibility of the experts who would run the 
 
 3. Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Legacy of U.S. Educational Leadership: Notes on 
Distribution and Economic Growth in the 20th Century, AM. ECON. REV., May 2001, at 18, 20. 
 4. For a useful summary of Progressive Era legislation, see Price Fishback, The Progressive Era, 
in GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A NEW HISTORY 288, 288–322 (2007). 
 5. See id. 
 6. Donald C. Bellomy, “Social Darwinism” Revisited, 1 PERSP. AM. HIST. 1, 18 (1984). 
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welfare state they envisioned, and a faith that expertise could not only serve the 
social good, but also identify it. 
Thus did labor reformers view the working poor and other economically 
marginal groups with great ambivalence. The reformers depicted the poor as 
victims in need of uplift but also as threats requiring social control. This 
fundamental tension was ultimately resolved by the appeal to hereditary fitness 
as a scientific basis for distinguishing workers worthy of uplift from workers 
who should be regarded as threats to the health and wellbeing of the economy 
and of society. 
So, though progressives did, of course, advocate for labor, they also depicted 
many groups of poor workers as undeserving of uplift, indeed as the cause 
rather than the consequence of low wages.7 While progressives did advocate for 
women’s rights, they also promoted a vision of economic and family life that 
would remove women from the labor force, the better to meet women’s 
obligations to be “mothers of the race” and to defer to the male breadwinner, a 
model also known as the “family wage.”8 Progressive economists and their 
reform allies offered uplift only to those groups they deemed deserving of work, 
arguing that in the name of social control the labor force should be rid of unfit 
workers: the immigrants, African Americans, women, and other “defectives.” 
C. The Unfit As “Unemployable” 
American labor reformers judged an impressive array of human groups, 
male Anglo-Saxon heads of household excepted, to be unworthy of work, or 
“unemployable.”9 The unemployable were those workers who, owing to 
putative hereditary debility, earned less than what American reformers called a 
“living wage.” Reformers understood the difference between actual wages and 
living wages as entailing a shortfall that must be met by charity, by the state, or 
by other members of the worker’s household. By this logic, reformers called 
firms that paid workers less than living wages “parasites,” an epithet also 
attached to workers who received such wages.10 Fabian socialists Sidney and 
Beatrice Webb, to pick an influential example, classified as unemployable 
children, the aged, and the child-bearing women[,] . . . the sick and the crippled, the 
idiots and lunatics, the epileptic, the blind and the deaf and dumb, the criminals and 
the incorrigibly idle, and all who are actually “morally deficient” . . . and [those] 
incapable of steady or continuous application, or who are so deficient in strength, 
speed, or skill that they are incapable . . . of producing their maintenance at any 
occupation whatsoever.11 
 
 7. See Thomas C. Leonard, “More Merciful and Not Less Effective”: Eugenics and American 
Economics in the Progressive Era, 35 HIST. POL. ECON. 687 (2003) (documenting labor-reformer 
hostility to poor workers belonging to classes deemed to cause low wages). 
 8. See Thomas C. Leonard, Protecting Family and Race: The Progressive Case for Regulating 
Women’s Work, 64 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 757 (2005) (documenting progressive opposition to women’s 
labor-force participation, and its various rationales). 
 9. See Leonard, supra note 7. 
 10. See, e.g., SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 786 (2d ed. 1920). 
 11. Id. at 785. 
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Progressive Era reform economists argued that a worker’s standard of 
living, not his productivity, determined market wages. Making wages a function 
of living standards opened the door to the eugenic claim that immigrant groups 
were hereditarily predisposed to low standards of living. Economist-turned-
sociologist Edward A. Ross, for example, argued that “the coolie, though he 
cannot outdo the American, can underlive him.”12 “Native” workers were more 
productive, claimed Ross, but because Chinese immigrants were racially 
disposed to work for lower wages, they displaced the “native” workers, the 
Anglo-Saxon race disposed to “American” wages.13 
In Races and Immigrants, labor economist John R. Commons argued that 
“[t]he Jewish sweatshop is the tragic penalty paid by that ambitious race.”14 For 
Commons, when inferior races were allowed to work, their economic 
competition not only lowered wages, it also biologically selected for the unfit 
races. “[C]ompetition has no respect for superior races,” said Commons; “[t]he 
race with lowest necessities displaces others.”15 Because race, not productivity, 
determined living standards, Commons could populate his low-wage-races 
category with the industrious and lazy alike. African Americans, he said, were 
“indolent and fickle,” which explained why slavery was defensible, even 
necessary: “The negro could not possibly have found a place in American 
industry had he come as a free man . . . . [I]f such races are to adopt that 
industrious life which is second nature to races of the temperate zones, it is only 
through some form of compulsion.”16 
Few groups escaped the reformers’ low-wage-race indictment. Labor leader 
Eugene Debs said in 1891 of Italian immigrant workers, “‘The Dago . . . lives far 
more like a savage or a wild be[a]st than the Chinese’ and therefore can 
‘underbid the American workingman.’”17 Wharton School reformer Scott 
Nearing volunteered that if “[a]n employer has a Scotchman working for him at 
$3 a day [and] [a]n equally efficient Lithuanian offers to do the same work for 
$2 . . . the work is given to the lowest bidder.”18 Paul Kellogg, editor of The 
Survey, one of the most influential organs of progressive ideas, defended 
 
 12. EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, SEVENTY YEARS OF IT 70 (1936). 
 13. In the Progressive Era, an “American” standard of living referred not merely to a neutral 
measure of how U.S. workers lived, but also, more invidiously, to a category of deserving “native” 
workers, to be distinguished from immigrant workers. See, e.g., AMERICAN PLANES AND STANDARDS 
OF LIVING (Thomas Eliot ed., 1931). 
 14. JOHN R. COMMONS, RACES AND IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICA 148 (1907). 
 15. Id. at 151. 
 16. Id. at 136. In Commons’s view, poor Appalachian whites, owing to their racial fitness as Anglo-
Saxons, could be educated and thereby assimilated into American life. Poor African Americans could 
not be so uplifted. African American inferiority, Commons believed, could be remedied only by 
interbreeding with superior races. Id. at 213. In addition to the twelve percent of Americans who were 
African American, Commons estimated that “defectives” constituted fully 5.5 percent of the U.S. 
population in 1890 and that nearly two percent of the population was irredeemably defective. John R. 
Commons, Natural Selection, Social Selection and Heredity, ARENA, July 1897, at 90, 93. 
 17. LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING OF 
CONSUMER SOCIETY 89 (1997). 
 18. Scott Nearing, The Adequacy of American Wages, 59 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
111, 122 (1915). 
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legislation “to exclude [Angelo] Lucca and [Alexis] Spivak and other ‘greeners’ 
from our congregate industries, which beckon to them now.”19 
When U.S. labor reformers studied legislation in countries more precocious 
with respect to labor reform, they favorably commented on the eugenic efficacy 
of labor laws in excluding the low-wage races from work. Harvard’s Arthur 
Holcombe, a member of the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Commission, 
referred approvingly to the intent of the minimum-wage law in Victoria, 
Australia, to “protect the white Australian’s standard of living from the 
insidious competition of colored races, particularly of the Chinese.”20 
For labor reformers, the threat of the low-wage immigrant races was two-
fold. The low-wage races threatened American wage levels, and their putatively 
greater fertility also threatened the health and viability of the Anglo-Saxon 
race. The latter claim was known as “race suicide,” a term for the idea that 
persons of inferior stock outbreed their biological betters. Races compete, 
argued race-suicide theorists, and racial competition is subject to a kind of 
Gresham’s law. 
“Race suicide” was coined by Edward A. Ross, who bemoaned that “[t]he 
higher race quietly and unmurmuringly eliminates itself rather than endure 
individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward off by collective 
action.”21 Ross’s theory was that the “native” Anglo-Saxon stock was 
biologically well adapted to rural, traditional life but less well suited to the new 
urban, industrial milieu of capitalism.22 Thus could the inferior immigrant races, 
“beaten members of beaten breeds,” outbreed the superior Anglo-Saxon race.23 
New immigrant stock, while racially inferior, was, said Ross, better adapted to 
the conditions of industrial capitalism.24 Ross’s coinage gained enough currency 
to be used frequently by President Theodore Roosevelt, who called race suicide 
the “greatest problem of civilization.”25 
Confronted with this two-fold threat, the task for reformers was to devise 
scientific methods for identifying low-wage races and other inferior groups (for 
example, the “feeble-minded”)—such as cranial measurements, literacy tests, 
and intelligence tests—and to promote laws that would exclude inferiors from 
 
 19. Paul U. Kellogg, Immigration and the Minimum Wage, 48 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 66, 75 (1913). 
 20. A.N. Holcombe, The Legal Minimum Wage in the United States, 2 AM. ECON. REV. 21, 21 
(1912). 
 21. Edward A. Ross, The Causes of Race Superiority, 18 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 67, 
88 (1901). 
 22. See EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, SOCIAL CONTROL: A SURVEY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
ORDER (1901) (elaborating this theory). 
 23. See EDWARD ALSWORTH ROSS, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOLOGY 393 (1917). 
 24. Ross was no better disposed to African Americans. He wrote, “The theory that races are 
virtually equal in capacity leads to such monumental follies as lining the valleys of the South with the 
bones of half a million picked whites in order to improve the conditions of four million unpicked 
blacks.” Edward A. Ross, Comment on D. Collin Wells’ “Social Darwinism,” 12 AM. J. SOC. 695, 715 
(1907). 
 25. Theodore Roosevelt, A Letter from President Roosevelt on Race Suicide, 35 AM. MONTHLY 
REV. REVS. 550, 550 (1907). 
08_BERNSTEIN & LEONARD_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:24:03 PM 
Summer 2009] EXCLUDING UNFIT WORKERS 183 
work and isolate them for eugenic treatment. Two historically important 
vehicles for exclusion were immigration barriers and statutory minimum wages. 
D. Immigration and “Race Suicide” 
The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 ended the era of open immigration to 
the United States.26 Already stalled by World War I, the immigration of the 
eastern and southern European peoples, which had averaged 730,000 per year 
in the decade before World War I, plummeted to a scant 20,000 persons per 
year following the eugenics-inspired Immigration Act of 1924, which also 
barred immigration from Japan.27 The 1920s quota acts culminated years of 
attempts by anti-immigration forces to prevent the immigration of groups 
whose innate incapacities they deemed a threat to American blood, American 
wages, and American democracy. 
The American Economic Association (AEA), founded in 1885, almost 
immediately began offering annual prizes for the best essay on the evils of 
unrestricted immigration.28 America’s academic and cultural leaders needed few 
such incentives, though, to spur the expression of anti-immigrant fervor. For 
many of them, the immigration issue concerned not numbers, but blood. In 
1887, progressive economist Edward Bemis devised the idea of using a literacy 
test to exclude putatively unfit immigrants, particularly those from southern and 
eastern Europe.29 In a presidential address to the Eugenics Research 
Association, leading economist Irving Fisher said, “If we could leave out of 
account the question of race and eugenics, I should, as an economist, be 
inclined to the view that unrestricted immigration . . . is economically 
advantageous to a country as a whole . . . .”30 But, cautioned Fisher, “[t]he core 
of the problem of immigration is . . . one of race and eugenics”: the problem of 
the Anglo-Saxon racial stock being overwhelmed by racially inferior 
“defectives, delinquents and dependents.”31 “[Mine] is not an argument against 
immigration,” demurred University of Chicago sociologist Charles Henderson, 
“but only against the immigration of persons who can never be induced to 
demand a civilized scale of life.”32 Remove the unfit, said Henderson, and “the 
real workers will more easily rise in earning power.”33 Wharton School reformer 
Simon Patten argued that social progress is “a higher law than equality” and 
 
 26. Chinese immigration was banned in 1882 by the Chinese Exclusion Act, legislation that 
stigmatized Chinese Americans as racially inferior and inassimilable. Chinese Exclusion Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 262–97 (1882) (repealed 1943). 
 27. Claudia Goldin, The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States, 1890 to 
1921, in THE REGULATION OF THE ECONOMY 223, 239 (Claudia Goldin & Gary Liebcap eds., 1994). 
 28. JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860–1925, at 
41 (1978). 
 29. E.W. Bemis, Restriction of Immigration, ANDOVER REV., March 1888, at 251–64. 
 30. Irving Fisher, Impending Problems of Eugenics, 13 SCI. MONTHLY 214, 226 (1921). 
 31. Id. at 227. 
 32. Charles R. Henderson, Are Modern Industry and City Life Unfavorable to the Family?, 10 AM. 
ECON. ASS’N Q. 217, 232 (1909). 
 33. Charles R. Henderson, Science in Philanthropy, 85 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 249, 253 (1900). 
08_BERNSTEIN & LEONARD_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:24:03 PM 
184 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:177 
proposed the “eradication of the vicious and inefficient.”34 Henry Farnam, 
cofounder of the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) and 
later AEA president, thought the growth of the unfit classes rendered “more 
and more imperative the solution of that exceedingly difficult problem which 
Mr. Arnold White calls ‘the sterilization of the unfit.’”35 Ross, well known for 
his militancy against immigration, once suggested that “should the wors[e] come 
to the worst, it would be better for us if we were to turn our guns upon every 
vessel bringing [Asiatics] to our shores rather than to permit them to land.”36 
Economists since Malthus had worried about the consequences of excess 
population, but as Simon Patten recognized, “the cry of race suicide has 
displaced the old fear of overpopulation.”37 Francis Amasa Walker, president of 
MIT and of the AEA and director of the U.S. Census of 1870 and of 1880, 
offered an especially influential theory of race suicide. Walker argued that 
immigration itself checked the natural fertility of the native population, so that 
inferior foreign-born stock effectively displaced superior native stock: “[T]he 
native element failed to maintain its previous rate of increase because the 
foreigners came in such swarms.”38 The American shrank from industrial 
competition with the low-wage races, Walker argued: “He was unwilling himself 
to engage in the lowest kind of day-labor with these new elements of the 
population; he was even more unwilling to bring sons and daughters into the 
world to enter into that competition.”39 Walker characterized the low-wage 
races, “peasants” from “southern Italy, Hungary, Austria, and Russia,” as 
“beaten men from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle 
for existence.”40 Without immigration restriction, Walker warned, “every foul 
and stagnant pool of population in Europe, [in] which no breath of intellectual 
life has stirred for ages . . . [will] be decanted upon our shores.”41 
Anti-immigrant groups were pleased to appeal to Walker’s authority. Henry 
Pratt Fairchild, Yale economist and author of The Melting Pot Mistake, said, 
“[O]ur immigrants are not additions to our total population, but supplanters of 
native children, to whom they deny the privilege of being born.”42 Prescott Hall, 
cofounder of the Immigration Restriction League, characterized Walker’s 
account thus: “[T]he main point is that the native children are murdered by 
 
 34. SIMON N. PATTEN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH THOUGHT: A STUDY IN THE ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 302–03 (1899). 
 35. Henry W. Farnam, The State and the Poor, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 282, 295 (1888). 
 36. MARY O. FURNER, ADVOCACY AND OBJECTIVITY: A CRISIS IN THE PROFESSIONALIZATION 
OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1865–1905, at 236 (1975). 
 37. S.N. Patten, Theories of Progress, 2 AM. ECON. REV. 61, 64 (1912). 
 38. FRANCIS A. WALKER, DISCUSSIONS IN ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 423 (Davis R. Dewey 
ed., 1899) (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at 424. 
 40. Francis A. Walker, Restriction of Immigration, 77 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 822, 828 (1896). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Henry Pratt Fairchild, The Paradox of Immigration, 17 AM. J. SOC. 254, 263 (1911). 
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never being allowed to come into existence, as surely as if put to death in some 
older invasion of the Huns and Vandals.”43 
Race-suicide theories were popular abroad as well, differing principally in 
their conception of which inferior races constituted the eugenic threat. In 
England, for example, Sidney Webb devised a novel term, “adverse selection,” 
to describe what he saw as English race suicide: 
Twenty-five percent of our parents, as Professor Karl Pearson keeps warning us, is 
producing 50 percent of the next generation. This can hardly result in anything but 
national deterioration; or, as an alternative, in this country gradually falling to the 
Irish and the Jews.44 
Eugenic views of inferior groups were commonplace in the Progressive Era 
textbooks of leading economists. In his Elementary Principles, Irving Fisher 
declared that “if the vitality or vital capital is impaired by a breeding of the 
worst and a cessation of the breeding of the best, no greater calamity could be 
imagined.”45 Fortunately, said Fisher, eugenics offered a means, “by isolation in 
public institutions and in some cases by surgical operation,” to prevent the 
calamity of “inheritable taint.”46 Similarly, Princeton economist Frank Fetter 
lamented, “Democracy and opportunity are increasing the mediocre and 
reducing the excellent strains of stock . . . . Progress is threatened unless social 
institutions can be so adjusted as to reverse this process of multiplying the 
poorest, and of extinguishing the most capable families.”47 Eugenic policies 
would introduce “an element of rational direction into the process of 
perpetuating the race.”48 In his Principles of Economics, Harvard’s Frank 
Taussig asked, rhetorically, “how . . . deal with the unemployable?”49 Taussig 
identified two classes of unemployable workers, distinguishing the aged, infirm, 
and disabled from the “feeble minded[,] . . . those saturated by alcohol or 
tainted with hereditary disease . . . [and] the irretrievable criminals and tramps.” 
The latter class, Taussig proposed, “should simply be stamped out.” “We have 
not reached the stage,” Taussig allowed, “where we can proceed to chloroform 
them once [and] for all; but at least they can be segregated, shut up in refuges 
and asylums, and prevented from propagating their kind.”50 
 
 43. Prescott F. Hall, Selection of Immigration, 24 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 169, 182 
(1904). 
 44. Sidney Webb, Fabian Tract No. 131: The Decline in the Birth-Rate, in FABIAN TRACTS 17 
(1907). 
 45. IRVING FISHER, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 476 (1912). 
 46. Id. at 476. 
 47. FRANK A. FETTER, 1 ECONOMICS: ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 421 (1918). 
 48. Id. at 422. 
 49. FRANK W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 300 (1912). 
 50. Id. 
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E. The (Purported) Eugenic Benefits of Minimum-Wage Laws 
Minimum-wage legislation, passed by several states beginning with 
Massachusetts in 1912,51 was the sine qua non of progressive labor reform, and 
progressive economists championed minimum wages. But eugenically minded 
progressives advocated minimum wages precisely because binding minimums 
would cause job losses.52 They argued that minimum-wage-induced job loss was 
a social benefit because it performed the eugenic service of ridding the labor 
force of the “unemployable.” Sidney and Beatrice Webb, as ever, put it plainly: 
“With regard to certain sections of the population [the unemployable], this 
unemployment is not a mark of social disease, but actually of social health.”53 
“[O]f all ways of dealing with these unfortunate parasites,” Sidney Webb 
opined, “the most ruinous to the community is to allow them unrestrainedly to 
compete as wage earners . . . .”54 Columbia’s Henry Rogers Seager, future AEA 
president and a leading progressive economist, argued that deserving workers 
needed protection from the “wearing competition of the casual worker and the 
drifter” and from the other “defectives” who drag down the wages of more 
deserving workers.55 The minimum wage protects deserving workers from the 
competition of the unfit by making it illegal to work for less: “The operation of 
the minimum wage requirement would merely extend the definition of 
defectives to embrace all individuals, who even after having received special 
training, remain incapable of adequate self-support,”56 that is, of earning a living 
wage. 
Seager made clear what should happen to those who, even after remedial 
training, could not earn the legal minimum: “If we are to maintain a race that is 
to be made of up of capable, efficient and independent individuals and family 
groups we must courageously cut off lines of heredity that have been proved to 
be undesirable by isolation or sterilization . . . .”57 A.B. Wolfe, an American 
progressive economist and future AEA president, also argued for the eugenic 
virtues of removing from employment those who are “a burden on society.”58 “If 
the inefficient entrepreneurs would be eliminated [by minimum wages,] so 
 
 51. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS BULL. NO. 167, MINIMUM WAGE 
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES 31 (1915). 
 52. Neoclassical critics, such as Alfred Marshall, Philip Wicksteed, and John Bates Clark, argued 
that legally induced disemployment should be seen as a social cost of minimum wages, not as a putative 
social benefit. See Thomas C. Leonard, The Very Idea of Applying Economics: The Modern Minimum-
Wage Controversy and Its Antecedents, in TOWARD A HISTORY OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 117–44 
(Roger E. Backhouse & Jeff Biddle eds., 2000). 
 53. WEBB & WEBB, supra note 10, at 785. 
 54. Sidney Webb, The Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage, 20 J. POL. ECON. 973, 992 
(1912). 
 55. Henry R. Seager, The Minimum Wage as Part of a Program for Social Reform, 48 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 3, 12 (1913) [hereinafter Seager, Social Reform]; Henry Rogers Seager, The 
Theory of the Minimum Wage, 3 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 81, 82–83 (1913). 
 56. Seager, Social Reform, supra note 55, at 9. 
 57. Id. at 10. 
 58. A.B. Wolfe, Robert L. Hale, & John A. Ryan, Some Phases of the Minimum Wage: Discussion, 
7 AM. ECON. REV. 275, 278 (1917). 
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would the ineffective workers,” said Wolfe.59 “I am not disposed to waste much 
sympathy upon either class. The elimination of the inefficient is in line with our 
traditional emphasis on free competition, and also with the spirit and trend of 
modern social economics.”60 
For economic progressives, a minimum wage, which is a wage floor, had the 
useful property of segregating the unfit, who would lose their jobs, from the 
deserving workers, who would not. Royal Meeker, a Princeton economist who 
served as Woodrow Wilson’s Commissioner of Labor, opposed subsidies of 
poor workers’ wages because wage subsidies increase employment. “It is much 
better to enact a minimum-wage law, even if it deprives these unfortunates of 
work,” argued Meeker.61 
As with immigration restriction, the minimum-wage barrier was seen to 
meet the two-fold threat of inferior workers: it protected deserving workers’ 
wages by reducing the competition of inferior groups, and it identified (by 
disemploying) inferior groups, enabling eugenic treatment.62 Adopting a 
national minimum wage, argued the Webbs, would mark “out [weaklings and 
degenerates] . . . so that they could be isolated and properly treated.”63 Sidney 
Ball, another Fabian, likewise promoted minimum wages for enabling “a 
process of conscious social selection by which the industrial residuum is 
naturally sifted and made manageable for some kind of restorative, disciplinary, 
or, it may be, surgical treatment.”64 And Labor Commissioner Meeker argued, 
“Better that the state should support the inefficient wholly and prevent the 
multiplication of the breed than subsidize incompetence and unthrift, enabling 
them to bring forth after their kind.”65 
Felix Frankfurter, then the AALL’s legal counsel, found that the culling 
effects of minimum-wage laws helped buttress his legal defense of minimum 
wages. Instancing the police-power virtues of minimum wages for identifying 
(by disemployment) the class of the unemployable, Frankfurter argued that 
“[t]he state . . . may use means, like the present statute, of sorting the normal 
self-supporting workers from the unemployables and then deal with the latter 
appropriately as a special class . . . .”66 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Royal Meeker, Book Review: Cours d’Économie Politique, 25 POL. SCI. Q. 543, 544 (1910). 
 62. Some eugenicists without training in economics, such as Karl Pearson, opposed the minimum 
wage. But because Pearson incorrectly regarded minimum wages as subsidies rather than wage floors, 
he believed that minimum wages benefited the low-wage workers he regarded as inferior, and thus 
judged minimum wages to be dysgenic—selecting for the unfit—rather than eugenic in their effects. See 
DANIEL KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF HUMAN HEREDITY 33–
34 (1995). 
 63. WEBB & WEBB, supra note 10, at 787. 
 64. Sidney Ball, The Moral Aspects of Socialism, 6 INT’L J. ETHICS 290, 295 (1896). 
 65. Meeker, supra note 61, at 544. 
 66. Thomas Reed Powell, The Oregon Minimum-Wage Cases, 32 POL. SCI. Q. 296, 310 (1917). 
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F. Women Workers as Unemployable67 
Florence Kelley, perhaps the most influential U.S. labor reformer of the 
period, endorsed the Victoria, Australia, minimum-wage law as “redeeming the 
sweated trades.”68 It did so by preventing the “unbridled competition” of the 
unemployable, the “women, children, and Chinese [who] were reducing all the 
employees to starvation.”69 Kelley’s exclusion of Chinese and women workers 
from the category of “employee,” and her grouping of these workers with 
children, characteristically treats women and Chinese as both victims and 
threats. Her conflation depicts women and Chinese as children, thus in need of 
paternalistic protection, but also as competitive threats to the deserving, white 
male workers, thus in need of social control. 
Their current reputation for feminism notwithstanding, the original 
progressives were in fact deeply ambivalent about women’s participation in the 
labor force—and sometimes hostile to it. The reform case against women’s 
market work, couched as it often was in the language of protection, was subtler 
than the eugenic hysteria directed at immigrants and mental and moral 
defectives. Nonetheless, as with other groups they deemed unemployable, 
leading progressives portrayed women’s labor-force participation as socially 
and economically destructive—a threat to the wages of deserving workers 
(white, male heads of household), a threat to the sanctity of the home, and a 
threat to the eugenic health of the race. 
The tension between the progressives’ impulse to protect women and their 
impulse to control women manifested itself in the sometimes contradictory 
arguments for regulating women’s market work. Some progressives argued that 
women, too, deserved living wages.70 But even this more-egalitarian framing was 
often “maternalist”; that is, it conceived of women as mothers and guardians of 
the home first.71 So, when progressives calculated living wages, they assumed 
that male workers deserved a wage sufficient to support several dependents—
the so-called “family wage.” Women, however, deserved only enough to 
support a single woman living alone, presumably until marriage could end the 
 
 67. A fuller treatment of the material in this section can be found in Leonard, supra note 7. 
 68. Florence Kelley, Minimum-Wage Boards, 17 AM. J. SOC. 303, 304 (1911). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., Sophonsiba Breckenridge, The Home Responsibilities of Women Workers and the 
“Equal Wage,” 31 J. POL. ECON. 521, 543 (1923). 
 71. Even progressives prepared to dispense with traditional family arrangements made a virtue of 
motherhood, as suggested by the example of economist Charlotte Perkins Gilman and her sui generis 
feminist eugenics. In Women and Economics, Gilman aimed “[to] urge upon [thinking women] a new 
sense, not only of their social responsibility as individuals, but of their measureless racial importance as 
makers of men.” CHARLOTTE PERKINS STETSON GILMAN, WOMEN AND ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF 
THE ECONOMIC RELATION BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION vii 
(1898). Gilman’s feminist eugenics, what she called “Humaniculture,” envisioned women as the 
enlightened society’s eugenic agents. As radical as was Gilman’s conception, her account frames 
women primarily as mothers, if professional ones, for it is mothers on whom should fall the “racial duty 
of right selection.” Id. at 201. The “maternalist” case for motherhood was thus, in its essentials, a case 
against the employment of women, unless women were to be employed as mothers. 
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misfortune of market employment.72 “So long as men cannot be mothers,” 
Florence Kelley wrote in defense of female difference and female deference, 
“the cry Equality, Equality, where Nature has created Inequality is as stupid 
and as deadly as the cry Peace, Peace where there is no Peace.”73 
Moreover, even when progressives spoke of “equal pay for equal work,” 
they often were not referring to comparable worth. In the Progressive Era, 
“equal pay for equal work” also referred to the reform idea that motherhood—
which was seen to require removal from the labor force—should be recognized 
as socially vital work and should be compensated by the state.74 Paying women 
to stay home to bear and raise children was a popular progressive idea in the 
United States and abroad. Indeed, from 1911 to 1919, all but nine states passed 
“mothers’ pensions” laws.75 
Other arguments for regulating women’s work reflected the tension 
between the goals of protecting women and controlling women. One strand of 
paternalism argued that women, as the biologically weaker sex, needed, like 
children, protection from the hazards of market work (if not from the hazards 
of domestic labor), usually in the form of hours restrictions.76 Reformers also 
argued that minimum wages could serve a paternalistic (and moralistic) 
function by protecting wage-earning women (if not women working in the 
home) from the temptation of prostitution. Better-paid factory girls were less 
likely to succumb, a key selling point for promoters of social purity.77 
It is a peculiar sort of protection for women that proposes to protect men 
and to protect the Anglo-Saxon race from the labor-force participation of 
women. Indeed, the “family wage” and “mothers of the race” reasoning argued 
not for women’s rights but for women’s obligations, not for women’s welfare 
but for the welfare of men and the race. Nonetheless, the “family wage” 
argument was pervasive among reformers: “Almost all [progressive] welfare 
activists, male and female, endorsed the family-wage principle . . . .”78 
The “family wage” and “mothers of the race” rationales for women-only 
labor legislation essentially abandoned protection of women in favor of social 
 
 72. JOHN A. RYAN, A LIVING WAGE: ITS ETHICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS 107 (1906). 
 73. Florence Kelley, The New Women’s Party, THE SURVEY, Mar. 5, 1921, reprinted in SOCIAL 
FEMINISM, LABOR POLITICS, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 1920s, at 199 (Sybil Lipshultz ed., 
2002). 
 74. PAUL POPENOE & ROSWELL JOHNSON, APPLIED EUGENICS 380–81 (1918). 
 75. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 240 
(1998). 
 76. JOSEPHINE GOLDMARK, FATIGUE AND EFFICIENCY: A STUDY IN INDUSTRY 39–42 (1912). 
 77. Henry Seager, for example, argued that minimum wages would lessen “that greatest disgrace of 
our civilization, prostitution in aid of inadequate wages . . . . The $8-a-week girl . . . has more power to 
resist the temptations which our cities constantly present than the $5-a-week-girl.” Seager, Social 
Reform, supra note 60, at 11. John Bates Clark’s reply reminded Seager of his own logic regarding the 
disemployment effects of minimum wages: “If five dollars a week forces persons into vice, no wages at 
all would do it more surely and quickly, and here is a further claim on the state which no one can for a 
moment dispute.” John Bates Clark, The Minimum Wage, 112 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 289, 294. 
 78. Linda Gordon, Social Insurance and Public Assistance: The Influence of Gender in Welfare 
Thought in the United States, 1890–1935, 97 AM. HIST. REV. 19, 47 (1992). 
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control of women. The family-wage argument portrayed wage-earning women 
as usurpers of jobs that rightfully belonged to male heads of household. 
Returning women to the home would also ensure that women properly carried 
out their eugenic duties as “mothers of the race.” 
The arguments for women-only labor legislation were heterogeneous—
variously paternalistic, moralistic, maternalistic, and eugenicist. They were, 
moreover, sometimes internally inconsistent, reflecting the tension between the 
two progressive desiderata, to protect women and to control women. But, 
however different or inconsistent, all these arguments for regulating women’s 
work were premised upon the idea that women workers should be legally 
inferior to men, owing to their biological weakness or to their “natural” 
obligations to husband, family, and race. And, most importantly, all these 
arguments for regulating women’s work had the intended effect of discouraging 
women’s labor-force participation. 
III 
DEPRESSION-ERA LABOR LEGISLATION 
Despite the intellectual ferment of progressive economics, the progressives 
achieved relatively little in the way of major labor reform. Various states did 
pass workplace health and safety regulations,79 establish mandatory workers’ 
compensation programs,80 ban child labor,81 and institute maximum-hours laws 
for women.82 Yet the doctrine of liberty of contract, epitomized by Lochner v. 
New York, 83 stood in the way of more draconian and comprehensive regulation; 
the Court’s decisions restricting the scope of Congress’s commerce power 
prevented the federal government from addressing what progressives believed 
to be a “race to the bottom” among states to have lax labor rules to attract 
businesses; and World War I and the subsequent backlash against intrusive 
wartime government sapped the progressive reform agenda of its momentum. 
The 1920s were not the laissez faire “Roaring Twenties” of historical myth, but 
neither did American voters seem eager to return to the more statist agenda of 
the Progressive period. 
When the economic crisis of the Depression hit, however, the progressive 
influence on the intellectual climate took on new cogency. Although some of 
the reformers of the 1930s had ideologies similar to modern liberalism, the 
statism and lack of sympathy for “outsider” groups that characterized 
progressivism retained an atavistic hold on the reform agenda. Not surprisingly, 
then, the goals of the major labor legislation of the 1930s reflected progressive 
 
 79. See, e.g., Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton, 205 U.S. 60 (1907). 
 80. See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 
U.S. 210 (1917); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
 81. See Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325–26 (1913). 
 82. See, e.g., Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); 
Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
 83. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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priorities: to raise the wages of white men to a proper “family wage,” even if 
this meant limiting employment opportunities for minorities and women. Three 
examples of such legislation were the Davis–Bacon prevailing-wage law, New 
Deal federal minimum-wage legislation, and women-only state minimum-wage 
laws. 
A. The Davis–Bacon Act 
The Davis–Bacon Act of 1931 was designed to exclude African Americans 
and other workers deemed “defective” from the labor market for federal 
construction projects. The exclusion of African Americans was motivated by a 
combination of the self-interest of exclusionary unions, traditional racism, and 
the implicit (and sometimes explicit) view that migrant African American 
workers and other marginal members of the labor force should not be 
permitted to compete in the construction labor market. 
Davis–Bacon had its origins in competition between African American 
workers and exclusionary unions in New York. African Americans were mostly 
banned from New York’s construction unions.84 Nevertheless, by the late 1920s, 
African Americans, who made up about 4.8 percent of New York City’s total 
population, constituted about 2.5 percent of the city’s skilled construction 
workers and 7.3 percent of the unskilled.85 By the mid-1920s, New York was one 
of several states to have a law requiring that contractors on public-works 
projects pay their employees the “prevailing wage.”86 The prevailing wage was 
generally set at least as high as union wages to prevent union workers from 
being undercut by their competitors, including African Americans and others 
excluded from unions. 
When a case challenging the constitutionality of the prevailing-wage law 
reached the New York Court of Appeals, Justice Benjamin Cardozo defended 
the law on behalf of the majority, arguing that the law prevented the “merciless 
exploitation of the indigent or the idle.”87 Exactly how Cardozo thought the 
“indigent or idle” would be better off by being excluded entirely from public 
construction jobs is not clear. His opinion reflects the progressive sense that 
workers who could not command what the political process determined was an 
adequate wage should not be in the labor market at all. 
New York’s prevailing-wage law affected only state, not federal, public-
works projects. This discrepancy became an issue when Algernon Blair, a 
 
 84. David Bernstein, The Shameful, Wasteful History of New York’s Prevailing Wage Law, 7 GEO. 
MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 5 (1997); Roger Waldinger & Thomas Bailey, The Continuing Significance 
of Race: Racial Conflict and Racial Discrimination in Construction, 19 POL. & SOC’Y 291, 301 (1991). 
 85. Mark W. Kruman, Quotas for Blacks: The Public Works Administration and the Black 
Construction Worker, LAB. HIST., Winter 1975, at 37, 39. 
 86. In 1926, the United States Supreme Court found that an Oklahoma prevailing wage law 
unconstitutionally violated due process because its ill-defined terms were too vague for the employer to 
know what exactly he was or was not allowed to pay his employees. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 
U.S. 385 (1926). 
 87. Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N.Y. 317, 329 (1927). 
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contractor from Alabama, received a federal contract to build a Veteran’s 
Bureau hospital in Long Island, New York. In 1927, Representative Robert 
Bacon, who represented the district in which the hospital was built, submitted a 
bill that would require contractors working on federal public-works projects to 
comply with state prevailing-wage laws.88 According to Bacon’s statement to the 
House Committee on Labor, workers Algernon Blair brought into his district 
were herded onto this job, they were housed in shacks, they were paid a very low 
wage . . . . Of course, that meant that the labor conditions in that part of New York 
State where this hospital was to be built were entirely upset. It meant that the 
neighboring community was very much upset.89 
Congressman William Upshaw of Georgia, apparently aware that the 
workers in question were African Americans, responded, “You will not think 
that a southern man is more than human if he smiles over the fact of your 
reaction to that real problem you are confronted with in any community with a 
superabundance or large aggregation of negro labor.”90 Bacon denied anti-
African American animus, but made clear his discomfort with “defective” 
workers taking jobs that were assumed to belong to white union men: “I just 
merely mention that fact because that was the fact in this particular case, but 
the same thing would be true if you should bring in a lot of Mexican laborers or 
if you brought in any nonunion laborer from any other State.”91 
In 1928, Bacon proposed “A Bill to Require Contractors and 
Subcontractors Engaged on Public Works of the United States to Give Certain 
Preferences in the Employment of Labor.”92 The committee hearings provide 
further evidence that poor African American workers were considered 
“defectives” who should not be permitted to compete for jobs thought to be 
reserved for white men. Bacon submitted a letter in support of his bill to the 
Committee on Labor from Secretary of Labor James J. Davis. The letter 
recounted that a contractor from the South brought an “entire outfit of negro 
laborers from the South” into Bacon’s district, treated them poorly, and 
“employed no local labor.”93 Others reported likewise: William J. Spencer, 
Secretary of the Buildings Trades Department of the American Federation of 
Labor told the committee, 
There are complaints from all hospitals of the Veteran’s Bureau against the condition 
of employment on these jobs. That is true whether the job is in the States of 
Washington, Oregon, Oklahoma, or Florida. The same complaints come in. They are 
 
 88. A Bill to Require Contractors and Subcontractors Engaged on Public Works of the United 
States to Comply with State Laws Relating to Hours of Labor and Wages of Employees on State Public 
Works, H.R. 17069, 69th Cong. (1927). 
 89. Hours of Labor and Wages on Public Works: Hearing on H.R. 17069 Before the H. Comm. on 
Labor, 69th Cong. 2 (1927). 
 90. Id. at 3. 
 91. Id. at 4. 
 92. See Preferences in the Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Works: Hearings on H.R. 
11141 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928). The bill would have required 
federal contractors to give preference to residents of the state where the work is performed who are 
veterans, non-veteran residents, American citizens, and aliens, in that order. 
 93. Id. 
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due to the fact that a contractor from Alabama may go to North Port and take a crew 
of negro workers and house them on the site of construction within a stockade and 
feed them and keep his organization intact thereby and work that job contrary to the 
existing practices in the city of New York.94 
Emil Preiss of New York’s International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
reported that 
[t]here are thousands of skilled mechanics in [Long Island] today who are unable to 
obtain employment on [the Veteran’s hospital], owing to the fact that poorly-paid 
labor is imported and being housed somewhat like cattle on the job and that labor is 
living under conditions that an American workman could not countenance.95 
Preiss added that “the class of mechanics they are using out there today is an 
undesirable element of people. They are mixing with that community, but the 
community is refusing to house these people who can not be housed on the 
jobs.”96 Note that Preiss contrasted “American workmen,” implicitly defined as 
white union men, with African American migrant workers, who were deemed 
to be either not American, or not proper workmen, or both. 
In March 1930, the House Committee on Labor held hearings on two new 
bills to regulate labor on federal construction projects. Representative Sproul of 
Illinois spoke against low wages: 
It is manifestly unfair that a contractor who pays the prevailing rate of wages in the 
locality in which the Government’s work is done, and who bases his bid for the work 
upon the prevailing wage scales, should be underbid by a contractor whose intent is, if 
he is awarded the contract, to import labor at a much lower scale of wages . . . . What 
follows? He imports labor to which he pays less than the prevailing wage.97 
Sproul complained that at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital the contractor paid 
bricklayers less than the local prevailing wage.98 Later in the hearing, 
Representative John J. Cochran added that he had received “numerous 
complaints in recent months about southern contractors employing low-paid 
colored mechanics getting the work and bringing the employees from the South. 
Just recently there was trouble at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital.”99 
In January 1931, the House Committee on Labor held hearings on a 
prevailing-wage bill that was destined to become the Davis–Bacon Act. Bacon 
argued that the bill would prevent federal contractors from importing “cheap, 
bootleg labor” into a federal construction site and would remove the temptation 
to import “cheap, bootleg, itinerant labor.”100 At a Senate hearing on the bill, 
American Federation of Labor president William Green noted that “[c]olored 
labor is being brought in to demoralize wage rates” in a federal post-office job 
 
 94. Id. at 17. 
 95. Id. at 21. 
 96. Id. at 22–23. 
 97. Employment of Labor on Federal Construction Work, Hearings Before the Comm. on Labor, 
House of Representatives on H.R. 7995 and H.R. 9232, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (March 6, 1930). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 26–27 (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 20. 
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in Kingsport, Tennessee.101 T.A. Lane, of the Bricklayers’ Union, added that 
“cheap labor” was being imported from North Carolina to work on a post office 
in Alexandria.102 The Algernon Blair Company, he reported, had within the last 
six weeks acquired several additional federal contracts.103 
When the House debated the Davis–Bacon bill, several representatives 
alluded to the law’s aim of preventing “cheap” or “bootleg” laborers from 
working on federal projects. No one expressed concern about the fate of these 
workers if the law passed. 
Mr. LaGuardia: A contractor from Alabama was awarded the contract for the 
Northport Hospital, a Veterans’ Bureau hospital. I saw with my own eyes the labor 
that he imported there from the South and the conditions under which they were 
working. These unfortunate men were huddled in shacks living under most wretched 
conditions and being paid wages far below the standard. These unfortunate men were 
being exploited by the contractor. Local skilled and unskilled labor [was] not 
employed. The workmanship of the cheap imported labor was of course very 
inferior.104 
Mr. Bacon: The unscrupulous contractor who hitherto came in with cheap, bootleg 
labor must now come in and pay the prevailing rate of wages in the community where 
the building is to be built . . . .105 
Mr. Bacon: Members of Congress have been flooded with protests from all over the 
country that certain Federal contractors on current jobs are bringing into local 
communities outside labor, cheap labor, bootleg labor . . . .106 
Mr. Cochran: What would result if cheap labor was brought into my city? It would be 
resented, and trouble would result.107 
Mr. Allgood: Reference has been made to a contractor from Alabama who went to 
New York with bootleg labor. That is a fact. That contractor has cheap colored labor 
that he transports, and he puts them in cabins, and it is labor of that sort that is in 
competition with white labor throughout the country. This bill has merit, and with the 
extensive building program now being entered into, it is very important that we enact 
this measure.108 
The Davis–Bacon Act became law soon thereafter. As intended, the law 
prevented African Americans from working on federal construction projects, 
instead reserving the jobs for white union men.109 
 
 101. Wages of Laborers and Mechanics on Public Buildings: Before the S. Comm. Manufactures, 71st 
Cong. 10 (1931). 
 102. Id. at 15–16. 
 103. Id. 
 104. 74 CONG. REC. 6510 (1931). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 6511. 
 107. Id. at 6512. 
 108. Id. at 6513. 
 109. For details regarding how this played out, see DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF 
REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM 
RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL (2001). 
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B. New Deal Wage Legislation 
The influence of the progressive economists’ belief that low-paid African 
American workers were “defectives” who should not be permitted to compete 
on price with white workers continued during the New Deal. Dubious economic 
theories held by many New Dealers, along with perceived political self-interest, 
led the Roosevelt Administration to push for high mandatory-minimum wages 
for the South. Because the interests of unskilled African workers were 
considered of marginal importance at best, the New Dealers generally either 
ignored the devastating consequences minimum-wage legislation had for 
African Americans in the South or, in some cases, welcomed these 
consequences. 
Like jobs held by women and children, jobs held by African Americans 
were often considered “substandard” by New Dealers and were slated for 
permanent elimination. The minority within the Roosevelt Administration who 
cared about the welfare of African American workers assumed that African 
Americans would benefit from new, higher-wage jobs.110 Yet there were obvious 
barriers to such an outcome. African Americans suffered from massive 
discrimination when competing for high-wage jobs traditionally dominated by 
whites. Moreover, because of segregation and Jim Crow laws, African 
Americans generally had less human capital than whites and therefore were 
often unable to compete for higher-paying jobs regardless of discrimination.111 
At the dawn of the New Deal era, productivity and the cost of living were 
far lower in the South than in the North.112 Not surprisingly, wages were far 
lower as well.113 The South in 1938 was backward economically, had a simmering 
race problem, educated its youth in poor schools, and generally lacked air 
conditioning, which was still in its commercial infancy. The only advantage the 
South could offer employers was the region’s low wages. So the South relied on 
lower wages to attract industry, much to the chagrin of northern labor unions 
and businesses, which resented the competition. African Americans 
disproportionately filled the lowest-wage positions in the South. 
The Roosevelt Administration believed that the South functioned as a 
colonial economy, providing raw materials and cheap labor for the North.114 
Roosevelt administration officials, with the support of southern liberals, 
therefore believed that merely attracting new jobs to the South would not solve 
the South’s economic woes. They believed that low wages were the cause, not 
 
 110. One economist presciently predicted that enforced high wages in the South would lead to the 
loss of jobs for African Americans, which in turn would force them to go North. The economist 
concluded that although this process would be traumatic, it would redound to African Americans’ 
ultimate benefit. See Mercer G. Evans, Southern Wage Differentials Under the NRA, 1 S. ECON. J. 3, 7, 
11 (1934). 
 111. BRUCE J. SCHULMAN, FROM COTTON BELT TO SUNBELT: FEDERAL POLICY, ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOUTH, 1938–1980, at 6 (1991). 
 112. For the relevant statistics, see GAVIN WRIGHT, OLD SOUTH, NEW SOUTH (1986). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 6. 
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the consequence, of the South’s economic backwardness.115 Roosevelt himself 
believed that the South’s low wages damaged its economic prosperity.116 
Administration economists thought that despite much lower capital investment 
and productivity per worker in the South, lower regional wages had no 
economic justification.117 
Not surprisingly, then, New Deal economists and other influential members 
of the Roosevelt Administration concluded that the way to reduce southern 
poverty and industrial backwardness was to impose high wages on the region.118 
In effect, the Administration turned economic logic on its head, believing that 
wage increases would raise productivity.119 It is true, of course, that if employers 
are required to pay higher wages, they will hire better workers and make more 
and better use of technology. In that sense, requiring higher wages increases the 
average productivity of employed workers. But the New Dealers claimed that 
forcing employers to give workers higher wages would raise existing workers’ 
productivity by making them happier and healthier, which is, at best, a highly 
speculative proposition. Similar arguments had been relied upon by progressive 
economists to justify earlier minimum-wage plans.120 
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) created the first New Deal 
wage-setting rules. NIRA set “code” wages for various southern industrial jobs 
that were frequently far higher than market wages for similar jobs in the region. 
For example, as a result of NIRA, wages in the South’s largest industry, textiles, 
increased by almost seventy percent in five months.121 Predictably, the result of 
such massive wage increases was not an equally massive increase in the 
productivity of existing low-wage workers. Rather, employers invested in 
mechanization and dismissed their unskilled workers.122 
Instead of being ashamed or even concerned about these results, the Cotton 
Garment Code Authority, which set the relevant wage, bragged about reducing 
the use of “sweated, underpaid workers” in the garment industry.123 This 
organization proclaimed, “[S]urely it is no tragedy that concerns operating 54 
hours a week and paying less than ten cents an hour . . . have recorded losses in 
employment.”124 The Authority considered it necessary “to remove thousands of 
these substandard workers[,] . . . [who were] replaced by fewer, but far higher 
 
 115. Id. at 7. 
 116. Id. at 23. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 25. 
 119. Id. at 23. 
 120. See Robert E. Prasch, American Economists and Minimum Wage Legislation During the 
Progressive Era: 1912–1923, 20 J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 161 (1998). 
 121. SCHULMAN, supra note 111, at 22. It should be noted, however, that the textile codes were 
frequently circumvented. See generally BRYANT SIMON, A FABRIC OF DEFEAT: THE POLITICS OF 
SOUTH CAROLINA MILLHANDS, 1910–1948 (1998). 
 122. WRIGHT, supra note 112, at 223–25. 
 123. SCHULMAN, supra note 111, at 29. 
 124. Id. 
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paid and more productive wage earners.”125 They were apparently unconcerned 
about where the “substandard” employees of such concerns would find new 
employment. 
Although NIRA existed for only about two years, an architect of the law 
estimated that its wage provisions directly or indirectly led to the dismissal of 
500,000 African American workers.126 Others consider such estimates 
exaggerated because NIRA lasted so briefly and was widely circumvented.127 
Regardless, it seems clear that NIRA’s wage provisions had a significant 
negative effect on African American employment, and that the African 
Americans’ only respite from the law was the incompetence of the government 
in enforcing it.128 
Despite the hardships it imposed on low-wage southerner workers, NIRA 
had at least made some accommodations for regional wage differentials. The 
Public Works Administration also took into account the situation on the 
ground, paying significantly lower wages in the South than elsewhere in the 
United States.129 By contrast, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) created a 
national minimum wage and made no such adjustments.130 Representatives of 
southern industry had pleaded that the South be subject to a lower wage, given 
that thirteen percent of southern workers earned less than the initial minimum 
of twenty-five cents an hour mandated by the minimum wage law, compared to 
less than one-tenth of one percent of workers in the rest of the country.131 But by 
1938, when the FLSA was working its way through Congress, the Roosevelt 
Administration had decided to no longer accommodate southern interests.132 
The FLSA was not intended to reflect the status quo but to align the wage 
structure of southern industry with the rest of the nation by eliminating low-
wage employment in the South.133 Though standard economic theory suggests 
that wise investment in physical and human capital raises productivity, New 
Deal officials believed “improvements in physical well-being and morale” 
caused by government-imposed higher wages, would bring productivity gains.134 
FDR himself not only acknowledged that raising southern wages through 
legislation would imperil jobs in the short term, he welcomed this result. For 
example, in 1939, FDR stated that a southern mill with cheap labor and 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. CHARLES FREDERICK ROOS, NRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 173 (1937); see also WRIGHT, supra 
note 112, at 224. 
 127. See, e.g., RAYMOND WOLTERS, NEGROES AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 214 (1971). 
 128. See id. at 147. See generally Arthur F. Raper, The Southern Negro and the NRA, 64 GA. HIST. 
Q. 128, 134, 139–41 (1980). 
 129. SCHULMAN, supra note 111, at 58. 
 130. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. 
ch. 8 (2006)). 
 131. SCHULMAN, supra note 111, at 66. 
 132. Id. at 51. 
 133. Id. 
 134. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS BULL. NO. 898, at 102 (1947), quoted in SCHULMAN, 
supra note 111, at 64; see also id. at 51, 54, 60, 66. 
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outdated equipment “ought not to be in existence.”135 Roosevelt believed that 
long-term gains in efficiency and purchasing power would more than 
compensate the South, if not necessarily individual workers, for its short-term 
employment losses.136 
The New Dealers’ blasé attitude toward the unemployment the FLSA was 
expected to create resulted in part from their continued adherence to the old 
progressive “family wage” doctrine that only jobs paying high enough wages to 
properly support a family were acceptable. 
[I]f the FLSA imperiled any southern jobs, the President and other New Dealers 
assumed only substandard jobs were at risk and bade them good riddance . . . . Stable 
family employment and high family wages mattered more to federal authorities than 
did the total number employed. One of the perceived evils of low southern wages was 
that they made a man unable to support his family and forced his wife and children to 
work.137 
The New Dealers’ ideological predispositions were reinforced by raw 
political considerations. Northern branches of national industries such as 
textiles supported a national minimum wage specifically to suppress 
competition from lower-wage southern competitors.138 Labor unions with great 
influence in the Roosevelt Administration also supported a national minimum 
wage to suppress labor-market competition.139 Indeed, the American Federation 
of Labor took credit for the failure of the FLSA to provide for a lower 
minimum wage in the South.140 The administrator of the FLSA acknowledged 
that “[o]ne of the declared objectives” of the FLSA “was to bring to an end this 
migration of plants solely to obtain a source of cheap labor.”141 Other New 
Dealers hoped the FLSA would “break the political stranglehold of the planter 
and merchant-manufacturer oligarchy” in the South and so improve long-term 
prospects for New Deal liberalism to thrive in southern politics.142 
The disemployment effects of the FLSA were felt mainly by unskilled 
African American workers in the South, who were most likely to work in jobs 
that paid less than the government-imposed minimum wage.143 Some companies 
simply could not afford to pay the new wages and either replaced workers with 
productivity-enhancing technology or went out of business.144 Other firms 
managed to pay the new wages but replaced their African American workers 
 
 135. SCHULMAN, supra note 111, at 72. 
 136. Id. at 65–66. 
 137. Id. at 65. 
 138. Id. at 59, 65, 70. 
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 142. Steve Fraser, The “Labor Question,” in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 
1930–1980, at 55, 75 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); see also SCHULMAN, supra note 111, at 
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 143. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 398 (1944); WRIGHT, supra note 112, at 219. 
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with whites.145 The Labor Department reported that between 30,000 and 50,000 
workers, mostly southern African Americans, lost their jobs because of the 
minimum wage within two weeks of the FLSA’s imposition146—and that was 
before the scheduled increases to raise the minimum wage by an additional 
sixty percent over three years. African Americans in the tobacco industry were 
particularly hard hit. In Wilson, North Carolina, for example, machines 
replaced 2,000 African American tobacco stemmers in 1939.147 
The Act’s medium-term disemployment effects on African American 
workers were masked by other factors. In 1939, the Works Progress 
Administration provided temporary employment to about one million African 
Americans,148 some of whom would otherwise have been left unemployed by the 
FLSA. By the time the Supreme Court upheld the FLSA in 1941,149 the Great 
Depression’s labor surplus was replaced with a wartime labor shortage,150 
substantially increasing the employment opportunities for African Americans in 
the private sector.151 Schulman concludes that “[t]he defense boom [probably] 
averted an economic catastrophe for southern industry” because war-related 
production, and the accompanying demand for labor, drove wages well above 
the forty-cent minimum.152 The World War II military also absorbed hundreds 
of thousands of working-age African American men. 
By 1943, however, economist Gunnar Myrdal was able to predict the 
negative effects that the FLSA was to have on postwar African American 
employment, particularly in the South: 
As low wages and sub-standard labor conditions are most prevalent in the South, this 
danger [of unemployment] is mainly restricted to Negro labor in that region. When 
the jobs are made better, the employer becomes less eager to hire Negroes, and white 
workers become more eager to take the jobs from the Negroes. There is, in addition, 
the possibility that the policy of setting minimum standards might cause some jobs to 
disappear altogether or to become greatly decreased. . . . If labor gets more expensive, 
it is more likely to be economized and substituted for by machines. Also inefficient 
industries . . . may be put out of business when the government sets minimum 
standards.153 
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Moreover, as Myrdal noted, the South’s main selling point in its attempt to 
lure industry was its cheap labor. The FLSA partially negated this advantage, 
resulting in fewer opportunities for African Americans in southern industry.154 
Instead, many young African Americans, displaced by a combination of the 
FLSA, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and emerging technologies, moved 
north, where unemployment rates for unskilled young African Americans were 
already very high.155 The result was a massive, long-term increase in 
unemployment in African American men, with the attendant social dislocations. 
C. Protective Legislation for Women 
The belief that women workers were “defective” and should not be 
permitted to compete with male workers seeking a “family wage” continued 
well beyond the Progressive Era. Nevertheless, reformers were stymied by the 
Supreme Court’s controversial 1923 decision in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.156 
In Adkins, the Court held that sex-based minimum-wage laws were 
unconstitutional as a violation of both liberty of contract and women’s rights.157 
When the Great Depression hit, several states decided to begin enforcing 
their minimum-wage laws for women, hoping that the Supreme Court would 
reconsider its holding in Adkins in light of economic circumstances. In 1936, the 
Supreme Court invalidated New York’s minimum-wage law.158 Justice Owen 
Roberts, a moderate Hoover appointee, joined the Court’s conservative “Four 
Horsemen” in the 5–4 decision. The Court wrote that “the State is without 
power . . . [to regulate] contracts between employers and adult women workers 
as to the amount of wages to be paid.”159 The Court added that “proscribing 
minimum wages for women alone would unreasonably restrain them in 
competition with men and tend arbitrarily to deprive them of employment and 
a fair chance to find work.”160 
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, a strong critic of the opinion, 
revealed that many reformers continued to believe that the legal status of 
women, at least in the workplace, should be similar to that of minor children. 
Even though child labor was not an issue in the case, and the Supreme Court 
had previously upheld state child-labor laws, Ickes wrote sarcastically that the 
Adkins Court upheld the “sacred right of . . . an immature child or helpless 
woman to drive a bargain with a great corporation.”161 In fact, the Court’s 
opinion was based on the notion that adult women should be treated the same 
as men, and not like children. 
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In 1937, following much public outrage and the overwhelming reelection of 
President Franklin Roosevelt, Justice Roberts switched sides, and the Court 
issued a broad opinion, authored by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 
upholding a minimum-wage law for women.162 The Court’s primary argument 
did not directly challenge the constitutional right to liberty of contract. Instead, 
the Court narrowed liberty of contract’s scope and signaled its acquiescence to 
protective laws for both men and women. The Court argued that liberty of 
contract was merely a subset of liberty and could be abrogated in the public 
interest, as shown by other Supreme Court precedents, such as Muller v. 
Oregon,163 in which the Court upheld a maximum-hours law for women workers. 
Given the economic conditions during the Depression, a state legislature could 
reasonably try to guarantee women workers in general a living wage, even if 
this attempt resulted in unemployment among some fraction of women who 
could not command the minimum.164 
The Court’s conclusion was consistent with the view of many progressive 
economists, who, as noted previously, argued that “defective” workers who 
could not command “decent wages” should be forced out of the labor market 
rather than be allowed to depress wages for men seeking to support their 
families. In other words, many believed that it was a feature, not a bug, that 
minimum-wage laws caused unemployment for women at the bottom rung of 
the economic ladder. 
Progressives celebrated their victory in West Coast Hotel, and that ruling 
helped clear the way for extensive federal and state regulation of the labor 
market, a longstanding reformist goal. Yet the opinion was a significant step 
backwards for women’s rights. In West Coast Hotel, the Court adopted a 
patriarchal view of women’s place in society, even though the decision’s 
reasoning did not hinge on differentiating between the rights of male and 
female workers. Chief Justice Hughes quoted Muller v. Oregon for the 
proposition that “though limitations upon personal and contractual rights may 
be removed by legislation, there is that in [women’s] disposition and habits of 
life which will operate against a full assertion of those rights.”165 
By contrast, Justice Sutherland, in dissent, penned a rousing defense of 
women’s rights: 
The common-law rules restricting the power of women to make contracts have, under 
our system, long since practically disappeared. Women today stand upon a legal and 
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political equality with men. There is no longer any reason why they should be put in 
different classes in respect of their legal right to make contracts; nor should they be 
denied, in effect, the right to compete with men for work paying lower wages which 
men may be willing to accept. And it is an arbitrary exercise of the legislative power to 
do so.166 
Justice Sutherland added that “[t]he ability to make a fair bargain, as 
everyone knows, does not depend upon sex.”167 An unidentified woman wrote to 
Sutherland, “May I say that the minority opinion handed down in the 
Washington minimum wage case is, to me, what the rainbow was to Mr. 
Wordsworth? . . . You did my sex the honor of regarding women as persons and 
citizens.”168 
Although superfluous to the Court’s holding, Chief Justice Hughes’s 
assertion that women were properly subject to special regulations was relied 
upon for the next three decades to uphold the constitutionality of laws that 
excluded women from various occupations. In 1948, for example, the Supreme 
Court upheld a Michigan law prohibiting women from working as bartenders.169 
The purported purpose of the law was to protect women’s morals, but the law’s 
primary lobbyists were not social reformers or church groups, but labor unions 
representing male bartenders. Moreover, the law permitted women to work as 
cocktail waitresses,170 which would seem at least as great a threat to their moral 
standing. Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter wrote a mocking opinion dismissing 
an equal-protection challenge to the law, stating that the situation was “one of 
those rare instances where to state the question is in effect to answer it.”171 The 
right of women to compete in the labor force on the same terms as men 
remained a dead issue until the 1960s.172 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
American labor reformers promoted an ideology that advocated excluding 
from the workplace those they regarded undesirable, undeserving, or defective. 
Undesirable workers were those who were deemed unable, for genetic, social, 
or other reasons, to command what the reformers considered sufficiently high 
wages. Not coincidentally, the set of these undesirable workers overlapped 
considerably with members of groups deemed defective in some way or inferior 
to the norm, defined as native, white, male workers—in particular, African 
Americans, women, and, to a lesser extent, immigrants and the disabled. 
 
 166. Id. at 411–12 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 413. 
 168. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 161, at 176. 
 169. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
 170. SALLY J. KENNEY, FOR WHOSE PROTECTION? REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND 
EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN 48 (1992). 
 171. Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 465. 
 172. See KENNEY, supra note 170, at 50. 
08_BERNSTEIN & LEONARD_BOOK PROOF.DOC 11/9/2009  1:24:03 PM 
Summer 2009] EXCLUDING UNFIT WORKERS 203 
Once progressive ideology came to dominate government policy during the 
Great Depression, labor legislation was enacted that intentionally set out to 
exclude “undesirable” workers from the workplace. The Davis–Bacon Act of 
1931 sought to banish itinerant African American workers from federal 
construction projects; the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act established minimum-wage levels intended to destroy low-wage 
jobs primarily held by African Americans in the South; and various states 
enacted and enforced special minimum-wage laws for women. The Supreme 
Court upheld sex-specific minimum-wage laws with the knowledge that they 
would substantially narrow employment opportunities for women. 
The New Deal period, however, also saw the rise of a new egalitarian 
liberalism that promised to promote racial, and later gender, equality. This 
version of liberalism eventually carried the day, and modern liberals, including 
those who have embraced the “progressive” moniker, are no longer partisans of 
human inequality. By the time this transformation occurred, however, 
progressive labor legislation had wreaked havoc on the employment prospects 
of African Americans173 and women. 
Moreover, the older progressive habits of thought have not completely died 
out, especially when the interests of foreign or immigrant workers are at issue. 
For example, opponents of liberalized international trade claim that such trade 
improperly allows multinational corporations to “exploit” unskilled workers in 
labor-intensive industries in impoverished countries. Exploitation, in this 
context, seems to have no specific definition beyond “we don’t think they are 
getting paid enough.” Yet, basic economic theory suggests that if one 
substantially raised the wage levels of such workers, without improving their 
productivity via capital investment or otherwise, their employers would become 
less competitive and their jobs would be terminated. Given that calls for tighter 
trade rules are rarely accompanied by plans to increase the productivity of the 
workers allegedly suffering “exploitation,” the implicit argument is that it is 
better that the jobs held by these workers not exist at all. 
Relatedly, debates over the costs and benefits of immigration rarely take 
into account the benefits to the immigrants themselves. Debate over the impact 
of immigration on the wages and job prospects of “workers” rarely considers 
the welfare gains from immigration to the immigrants. Michael Dukakis and 
Daniel Mitchell, for example, advocate raising American minimum wages to 
deter undocumented Mexican workers: “[I]f we want to reduce illegal 
immigration, it makes sense to reduce the abundance of extremely low-paying 
[U.S.] jobs that fuels it.” Dukakis and Mitchell acknowledge that some “low-
end jobs may be lost” from a higher minimum wage, but they regard this job 
loss as a social good precisely because it would deny employment to (among 
others) “people who aren’t supposed to be here in the first place.”174 
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That is not to say that one cannot make legitimate arguments against 
liberalized trade or increased immigration, legal or illegal. Nor, for that matter, 
can one reasonably expect that the average person will consider the interests of 
“strangers,” such as potential immigrants or low-wage workers in the Third 
World, to be as important as the interests of existing members of his own 
political polity. But the history of labor reform in the Progressive and New Deal 
eras is a timely reminder that “progressive” economic arguments can be illiberal 
if they treat some individuals as less worthy of concern than others. 
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